

Cyber insurance, Ransomware and Regulation – where do we go from here?

29 June 2021

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The ransomware crisis and cyber insurance

- The escalating ransomware problem has put a strong focus on existing issues in the cyber insurance sector:
- 1) Has the possibility of claiming ransom payments on cyber insurance policies contributed to the current problem, and should ransoms be banned?
- 2) Are the ways the insurance industry measures the cyber risk of companies still appropriate for the current threat environment?
- 3) Could cyber insurance help protect SMEs and fix their notoriously low IT security standards?

Current trends

- Storm clouds are gathering over the cyber insurance industry:
- Until very recently, it was a highly profitable niche sector that kept growing every year, driven by customer demand. Now, ransomware has developed from a problem to an existential threat.
- Insurers raise premiums, lower coverage limits, experiment with ransomware exclusions, and shrink their portfolios.
- Munich Re CEO recently wondered whether ransomware damage might become uninsurable in the near future.

GAO cyber insurance market report, May 2021

- Customer demand for cyber insurance is rising, and they demand higher cyber specific coverage limits.
- Insurers are moving in the opposite direction and raising premiums.
- Some have begun to move out of specific sectors, such as healthcare and education.
- **Structural issues:**
 - Clients struggle to understand their policies as coverage and conditions are confusing and key terms left undefined.
 - Insurers complain about a lack of historical data on cyberattack-related costs. Together with the difficulty of measuring company cyber risk, this makes product pricing and development a challenge.

RUSI Cyber Insurance report, 28 June 2021

- Based on a two-year research project funded by the UK NCSC and others, this report offers 60 pages of analysis of the issues and challenges facing the cyber insurance market, with a focus on the UK.
- It makes 14 recommendations, ranging from proposals for premium incentives for SMEs to ideas for improved data sharing to compulsory cyber insurance for companies seeking government contracts.
- Very happy to discuss them during Q&A, especially since I disagree with most of them.

1) Ransoms and cyber insurance

- Insurers say they don't encourage ransoms but:
- Incident Response professionals insist this is happening.
- There are people making a living negotiating ransoms that work with insurers.
- Some Ransomware gangs claim they target insurers and work off their lists of insureds as payment is quick and unproblematic.
- **Economic incentive: paying ransoms is cheaper than covering a full rebuild of the IT system.**
- The Association of British Insurers has publicly defended the practice of offering insurance cover for ransoms.

So should ransoms be banned?

- While a comprehensive ban of ransoms as discussed in New York would seriously undermine the criminal's business model there are concerns:
- It might drive businesses and negotiators handling payments underground, creating a new criminal sector offshore.
- There would have to be exceptions for certain cases where ethical or humanitarian concerns prevail. Criminals might then target those.
- **Instead, we should:**
 - regulate and control the cryptocurrency exchanges (KYC rules).
 - Ban insurance coverage of ransom payments.

2) Measuring cyber risk

- One constant complain of insurers is that they would like more cyber claims and loss data, but data sharing remains difficult.
- Question: to what extent can historic data guide pricing decisions in the current cyber threat environment? Should the focus instead be on threat analysis and company risk assessment?
- There are established ways of measuring company cyber risk through intensive audits and site visits. Problem: that's expensive.
- As cyber insurance coverage is brought to more and more companies, how can cyber risk assessment be scaled or automated?

Why not just rely on the Bitsight score?

- When cyber security risk rating companies like Bitsight and Security Scorecard set up ten years ago, insurers were their first customers.
- Combining vulnerability scans, network monitoring and various streams of data, they let their algorithms create a score.
- As experiences have been mixed, key questions remain: how reliable are these scores, especially when compared with claims data?
- Can business decisions like granting coverage to a smaller company be made just based on a scan and online report?

What if we all relied on the BitSight score?

- None of these concerns has restrained the expansion of these companies: they attract huge amounts of venture capital and are expanding their business and customer base.
- The technology is currently winning over companies seeking to improve their cyber security third party risk management.
- Companies already get offered supplier contracts that automatically fall void if the BitSight score falls under 700.
- Thinking ahead, are we walking into a world where IT security budgets are allocated to maintain a rating rather than keeping the company secure?
- Might this shift resources away from everything that cannot be observed online from the outside?

But could regulation of third-party cyber security risk management save insurers?

- The increasing focus on supply chain cyber security is prompting regulation, particularly for providers of critical infrastructure.
- The EU's upcoming NIS 2.0 regulation draft includes a **requirement to conduct 'state of the art' third party risk management for cyber risk.**
- What does 'state of the art' mean? If it's more than BitSight scores, large companies will routinely audit their suppliers and suppliers will seek ways to demonstrate their trustworthiness.
- This could be a great opportunity for insurers to benefit from all these ratings and perhaps shape the policy process on ratings and certifications.

What could this look like in practice?

- Some member states have attempted to anticipate the new NIS requirements by setting up their own rating systems:
- KSV1870 in Austria (nationwide rating system for suppliers of critical infrastructure run by NimbuSec, launched January 2021).
- Pinakes in Spain (nationwide rating system for financial services industry, launched by LEET Security in February 2021).
- **Both argue their platform solutions are more reliable than scores without audits while offering much greater efficiency than companies conducting their own audits.** Both are untested in practice though...

3) Can Cyber insurance help protect SMEs?

- Report after report has confirmed that IT security standards at many SMEs remain shockingly low.
- The ENISA report on SMEs published yesterday confirmed a picture of low preparedness and a continuing belief cyber attacks happen to other, larger companies.
- New insights:
- **Shadow IT problem exacerbated by Corona**, without the control measures used in larger companies. This means they pose an **even larger supply chain risk than before**.
- IT security standards usually designed for more mature companies.

So why aren't SMEs buying cyber insurance?

- Signing up for cyber insurance costs **time, money and effort**, especially if the insurer suggests replacing outdated IT.
- Mistaken **belief they will not be targeted** (research shows recent experience of a cyberattack is a key motive for taking up insurance).
- Definitions and coverage options in the various policies are **confusing** – even brokers and large companies are struggling.
- **Doubts whether insurers will pay out in the end** – this is linked to the absence of universally accepted IT security standards.
- The insurance industry essentially ignores them – good money could be earned offering bespoke services to large companies.

How could compulsory cyber insurance work?

- Insurers would become the enforcers of a universal minimum IT security standard – this should be set externally.
- This should be condition for coverage – premium incentives will not work.
- Low premiums due to large market size.
- Coverage, support and access to incident response services for companies that so far refused to pay for cyber insurance.
- Insurers and companies would need between three and five years to prepare (similar to GDPR).
- Universal coverage will require a **backstop mechanism** to protect reinsurers from **cluster or aggregate risk**.