

## Beyond Incident Reporting

An Analysis of Structured Representations for Incident Response



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#### About us.

#### **Daniel Schlette**



- PhD Candidate
- Faculty of Informatics and Data Science
- Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) and incident response



#### **Marco Caselli**



- Senior Key Expert
- Siemens research department "Cybersecurity & Trust"
- OT attack detection and response

**SIEMENS** 

## This talk can serve your organization to ...




... have a look at incident response standards and formats

... compare and select these standards and formats using core concepts

... consider organizational factors for playbook modification

We observe a shift in perspective towards incident response representation.



#### Our motivations refer to the Neart Le Chéile theme.

#### **General Context**

- US Executive Order 14028 is calling for standardized governmental playbooks
- EU Cybersecurity Act is addressing security teams and information exchange

#### **Company Context**

- CONCORDIA\* and the ECCC
- Siemens Use Cases
  - ✓ Incident response automation
  - ✓ Playbook sharing across teams
  - ✓ Internal reporting

\*https://www.concordia-h2020.eu/



## Identified challenges concern representation and operations.



#### Incident Response Representation

- ✓ How do we approach the <u>problem?</u>
- √ Which representation (e.g., standard) should we use?


#### • Incident Response Operations

- ✓ How do we integrate a representation in our pipeline?
- ✓ How do we ensure maintainability?

Standardization efforts have different objectives that support categorization.



Incident response is defined by actuators, their actions, and artifacts.



#### Examples


- Analyst investigate file
- Security system block IP address
- Incident handler write report

## We base our analysis on core concepts of incident response.




Schlette, D., Caselli, M., & Pernul, G. (2021). A Comparative Study on Cyber Threat Intelligence: The Security Incident Response Perspective. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*, 23(4), pp. 2525-2556.

# Characteristics of CACAO cover the core concepts (to some extent).



Schlette, D., Caselli, M., & Pernul, G. (2021). A Comparative Study on Cyber Threat Intelligence: The Security Incident Response Perspective. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*, 23(4), pp. 2525-2556.

## Which format should you use for incident response sharing?






## CACAO is a suitable candidate for incident response sharing.


#### **Characteristics**

- Playbooks aggregate information
- Procedures are represented by workflows
- CACAO is backed by the OASIS community
- TLP and IEP address confidentiality





## The elephant in the room or why context matters.



Playbooks contain different types of information relevant for incident response operations.

## Playbook

Organizational information

Ransomware expert: Jane Doe

Technical information

iptables -A INPUT -s 192.168.1.1 -j DROP



Is organization-specific information important?



What determines organizationspecific information? We assume incident response is shaped by organizationspecific factors.








Do you think these factors do not influence the incident response process?

# Do you think these factors <u>do not</u> influence the incident response process?

1. Scan QR code 2. Enter your answer 3. Submit





Baseline incident response process (simplified)

Assign handler

CoA 1

CoA 2

Report to SOC

Manager

Baseline incident response process (simplified)

CoA 1

CoA 2

**Report to SOC** 

Manager




**Assign handler** 

Baseline incident response process (simplified) **Report to SOC Assign handler** CoA<sub>1</sub> CoA 2 Manager Case 1: Privacy (GDPR applies) **Report to SOC Assign handler Contact legal** CoA 1 CoA 2 Manager Baseline incident response process (simplified) **Report to SOC Assign handler** CoA 1 CoA 2 Manager

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
Eventually, incident response factors can be used to separate playbook information.




#### **Benefits**

- Sharing playbooks without disclosing confidential information
- Adapting and (semi-)automating external playbooks
- Maintaining organizational information and playbooks when changes occur

## Proposing incident response factors is an on-going project.








We conduct expert interviews to shed light on incident response factors.



#### **Preliminary Feedback**

- Interviewees mention modifications when factors apply
- Not all factors might impact incident response, but many do
- Additional feedback needed!





#### **Contact Details**

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• <u>IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials paper</u>

#### **Questions?**



